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CHAPTER 12 
Criminal Law, Procedure and Administration 
ARTHUR L. BERNEY 
§12.1. Crime in Massachusetts. Not to depart from customary 
practice, the data representing the annual increase in crime in the 
Commonwealth are here presented. Table I shows the increase in the 
major offense crime rate over the last five-year period for which in-
formation is available. Over this relatively short period the Massa-
chusetts crime rate has increased a startling 61 percent. 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
TABLE I 
Number of Major Offenses per One Hundred 
Thousand of Population: 1959-19631 
Total 
Offenses 
708.1 
750.6 
927.2 
1030.1 
1137.1 
Aggravated 
Assault 
19.4 
19.4 
22.6 
26.0 
28.8 
Murder and 
Non-negligent 
Manslaughter 
1.2 
1.4 
1.5 
1.8 
1.9 
Burglary 
287.5 
309.2 
376.1 
410.4 
443.1 
Forcible 
Rape 
4.5 
4.8 
5.6 
5.0 
4.5 
Larceny $50 
and over 
169.5 
184.2 
229.6 
257.5 
265.7 
Robbery 
16.5 
20.4 
20.4 
25.8 
27.0 
Auto Theft 
209.6 
211.1 
271.6 
303.6 
366.0 
In the past the figures for Massachusetts, New England, and the 
United States have been compared and consistently the Massachusetts 
crime rate falls between those of the other two areas.2 Although the 
rate of crime in the Commonwealth still trails the national average, 
the margin of difference becomes slighter each year. Over the same 
ARTHUR L. BERNEY is Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of Barry E. Rosenthal, 
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§12.1. 1 The data through 1962 is taken from 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.1, 
Table I. The 1963 figures are from the 1963 Uniform Crime Reports 57. 
2 See 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.1 at 121. 
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five-year period (1959-1963) the rate of increase is 50 percent in New 
England and 31 percent in the United States, as compared to the 61 
percent Massachusetts figure noted above. Should this trend con-
tinue, the Commonwealth rate of increase will soon outstrip the 
national rate - an ignominious honor. 
TABLE II 
Rate of Major Offenses Committed in Massachusetts, 
New England, and the United States per One 
Hundred Thousand of Population: 1959-19633 
Massachusetts New England United States 
1959 708.1 670.3 917.5 
1960 750.6 725.8 1038.7 
1961 927.2 811.3 1052.8 
1962 1030.1 884.2 1103.5 
1963 1137.1 1005.6 1198.3 
Presumably Massachusetts would show up better in a comparison 
with other similar urban-industrial states. But this is not the case; 
in fact, the rate of growth contrasts prove most unfavorable. As Table 
III shows, the Massachusetts increase in crime rate (61 percent) was 
approximated only by New Jersey (58 percent). The figures for New 
York, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, 34, 25, and 17 percent respectively, 
fall far below the Massachusetts high mark.4 
TABLE III 
Rate of Major Offenses Committed in Massachusetts, 
New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and 
Michigan per One Hundred Thousand 
of Population: 1959-196311 
New New 
Massachusetts York Pennsylvania Jersey Michigan 
1959 708.1 962.6 655.9 778.4 1077.2 
1960 750.6 1045.0 688.2 994.0 1230.9 
1961 927.2 1066.0 654.6 1005.5 1228.7 
1962 1030.1 1147.1 700.4 1125.6 1293.6 
1963 1137.1 1289.7 767.2 1234.4 1348.6 
3 The data through 1961 is taken from 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.1, Table 
III. The 1962 and 1961! figures are from the 1961! Uniform Crime Reports 48. 
4 The four states used for comparison were chosen on the basis of. demographic 
similarity. Naturally the choice was made without regard to previous crime 
record. In terms of population and ratio of population living in metropolitan 
areas, Massachusetts most resembles Michigan and New Jersey. The ratio of city 
population to over-all population in these three states is as follows: Massachusetts 
- 5,174,000/5,218,000 (99%); Michigan - 6,877,000/8,116,000 (85%); New Jersey 
_ 6,116,000/6,470,000 (95%). Compiled from 1961! Uniform Crime Reports 57-58, 60. 
II Compiled from 1959 Uniform Crime Reports 4l!-44, 46-48; 1960 Uniform Crime 
Reports 4l!-44, 46-48; 1961 Uniform Crime Reports l!6; 1962 Uniform Crime Reports 
45-46, 48-50; 1961! Uniform Crime Reports 57-58, 60-62. 
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Although the Massachusetts rate is still lower than the major crime 
rate for the nation (Table II) and lower than rates of three of four 
comparable northeastern states (Table III), its high rate of increase 
seems to demand investigation and explanation. Actually, the marked 
differences in rate of increase may yield to careful statistical analysis, 
or may be the result of poorly standardized data-taking techniques6 or 
of some other nonsubstantive distinction, but only further study would 
expose such bases as these. Whether the figures alone can direct in-
vestigation is questionable. For example, the hypothesis that the 
discrepancy in rate growth may be ascribed almost wholly to the rate 
of change in the single category of auto theft7 (see Table IV) is, at this 
stage of inquiry, a matter of conjecture. That the figures invite in-
vestigation by persons concerned with such matters as this is, however, 
beyond doubt. 
TABLE IV 
Number of Auto Thefts Committed per One Hundred 
Thousand of Population in Massachusetts, New York, 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Michigan, and the 
United States: 1959 and 19638 
Massachusetts New York Pennsylvania 
1959 209.6 164.1 116.5 
1963 366.0 229.0 157.0 
Amount of Increase 156.4 64.9 40.5 
New Jersey Michigan United States 
1959 159.3 175.8 162.3 
1963 260.1 223.4 211.6 
--
Amount of Increase 100.8 47.6 49.3 
§12.2. Procedural due process: Arrest, search and seizure. Mat-
ters of procedural due process continue to be the dominant theme of 
6 See Ferracuti, Hernandez and Wolfgang, A Study of Police Errors in Crime 
Classification, 58 J. Crim. L., C.&P.S. 113 (1962). The authors regarded their data 
"as additional proof of the low validity of crime reporting statistics and of the 
need for more careful control and specific training in this important police 
aLtivity." Id. at 119. See also F.B.I., Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook (1955). 
7 A reading of the applicable motor vehicle theft statutes proves the Massachusetts 
law, if anything, more specific and strict than those of the four sister states. 
Compare G.L., c. 266, §28, with Mich. Comp. Laws 750.413; N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:119-2; 
40 N.Y. Crim. Code c. 122, §§1293(a), 1294; and 18 Penn. Stat. §4903. Of course 
the kind of enforcement and administration a law receives qualifies its effect and 
meaning. For example, in 1961, out of 14,215 arrests in Massachusetts (1962 Uni-
form Crime Reports) for auto thefts, there were 1494 prosecutions and 864 con-
victions; 377 of those convicted were placed on probation. The records show that 
only 50 of these convicted persons were actually jailed in 1961, and only 21 re-
ceived sentences of two years or longer. See 1961 Mass. Dept. of Correction 
Statistical Report 20, 22, 44, 45, 88. 
8 Compiled from 1959 Uniform Crime Reports 35, 43-44, 46-48; 1963 Uniform 
Crime Reports 49, 57-58, 60-62. 
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criminal appeals in the Commonwealth. Recent major decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court in this areal provide the sustaining 
impetus to this laudable development. Almost all of the significant 
cases classifiable under the rubric Criminal Law raise issues of the 
administration of criminal justice under evolving constitutional stand-
ards. Many of these cases, consequently, are better considered under 
the heading Constitutional Law, and the reader is referred to that 
chapter of the SURVEy.2 
Commonwealth decisions in the 1964 SURVEY year continued the strug-
gle to work out the elements of illegal search and seizure.s As in many 
other areas of law in which standards of conduct are prescribed, the 
temptation to achieve meaningful organization through factual cate-
gorization is strong. Actually, this may prove the more efficacious ap-
proach when, as here, the initial judgments are normally made in a 
noncontemplative atmosphere by policemen, men ordinarily not of 
judicious temperament or training. Rules governing particular situa-
tions, not principles, are better suited to such circumstances. Thus, 
through comparing cases such as Commonwealth v. McCleery4 with 
Commonwealth v. LaBossiere5 and Rios v. United States,6 the scope of 
a legal search of an occupied vehicle begins to emerge. In a similar 
manner, comparison of Commonwealth v. Mekalian7 with Common-
wealth v. McDermott8 points up the differences between searches made 
pursuant to lawful and unlawful arrests of bookies.9 If the proscribed 
§12.2. 1 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 Sup. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 
2d 799 (1963) (right to counsel in state courts in noncapital offenses); Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961) (illegal search and 
seizure); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 
(1943) (federal requirements of early arraignment). 
2 See §§11.3; 11.4 supra. Cases treated in those sections and not separately treated 
here include Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1133, 200 N.E.2d 
264; La Morre v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hospital, 1964 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 859, 199 N.E.2d 204; Commonwealth v. Bouchard, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 727, 
198 N.E.2d 411; Commonwealth v. O'Leary, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 689, 198 N.E.2d 
403; Keenan v. Commonwealth, 346 Mass. 534, 194 N.E.2d 637 (1963); Letters v. 
Commonwealth, 346 Mass. 403, 193 N.E.2d 578 (1963). 
8 At least four cases that past SURVEY year involved search and seizure issues: 
Commonwealth v. LaBossiere, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 685, 198 N.E.2d 405; Common· 
wealth v. McDermott, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 519, 197 N.E.2d 668; Commonwealth v. 
Lehan, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 455, 196 N.E.2d 840; Commonwealth v. Mekalian, 346 
Mass. 496, 194 N.E.2d 390 (1963). 
4345 Mass. 151, 186 N.E.2d 598 (1962), noted in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§§10.2; 21.1. 
51964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 685, 198 N.E.2d 405. 
6364 U.S. 253, 80 Sup. Ct. 1431, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1688 (1960). See also Henry v. United 
States, 361 u.s. 98, 80 Sup. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1959); Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 Sup. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949); Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925). 
7346 Mass. 496, 194 N.E.2d 390 (1963). 
81964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 519, 197 N.E.2d 668. 
9 Both arrests were based on G.L., c. 271, §17. See also Commonwealth v. Ber-
wick, 346 Mass. 5, 189 N.E.2d 846 (1963), and Commonwealth v. Laudate, 345 Mass. 
169. 186 N.E.2d 598 (1962), both noted in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1O.2. 
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conduct does not involve a breach of the peace this means that a 
lawful arrest can afford to wait upon, and therefore must be pursuant 
to, a valid warrant. 
By far the most interesting of the arrest and search cases was 
Commonwealth v. Lehan,lo if for no other reason than the fact that 
it involved a pedestrian who, at the time of his initial detention and 
interrogation, was engaged in conduct no more suspicious than walking 
rapidly while carrying two cardboard cartons. Such a fact situation 
brings the force of search and seizure safeguards down to a personal 
level. 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court held that, in the absence of 
probable cause for arrest, the inspection of the cartons, to verify the 
suspect's description of their contents, was an illegal search,11 it was at 
pains to sustain the validity of "on-the-street detention" or "brief 
threshold inquiry" not amounting to an arrest. Reading the case of 
Rios v. United States12 as recognizing the constitutionality of such 
"threshold inquiry even with brief detention,"13 the Supreme Judicial 
Court concurred in the California high court's view, in People v. 
Mickelson,14 that the "Federal constitutional proscription of unreason-
able searches and seizures does not bar reasonable State rules covering 
on-the-street interrogation."15 Apparently the California court inter-
preted the federal decisions, including Rios, as elaborating a federal rule 
that would bar detention unless probable cause exists.16 The state 
rule authorizing this "reasonable on-the-street interrogation" in the 
Lehan case is General Laws, Chapter 41, Section 98,17 a supposed 
restatement of the New England night watch law18 and counterpart of 
101964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 455, 196 N.E.2d 840. 
11 Unless, of course, the fact finder determined that consent to search had been 
willingly given, or that the search had been made in order to assure the safety of the 
arresting officer-i.e., a frisking. Id. at 462, 196 N.E.2d at 846. See Uniform 
Arrest Act §3. 
12364 U.S. 253, 80 Sup. Ct. 1431, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1688 (1960). 
131964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 455, 459, 196 N.E.2d 840, 844. 
14 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P.2d 658 (1963). 
151964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 455, 460, 196 N.E.2d 840, 844. 
16 People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 451-452, 380 P.2d 658, 660 (1963). See 
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 Sup. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1959); Brinegar 
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 Sup. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949). See also Dodd, 
Cases on Constitutional Law 624 (1963 Supp.). 
17 "During the night time ... [police officers] may examine all persons abroad 
whom they have reason to suspect of unlawful design, and demand of them their 
business abroad and whither they are going. . .. Persons so suspected who do not 
give a satisfactory account of themselves ... may be arrested by the police, and 
may thereafter be safely kept by imprisonment or otherwise unless released in a 
manner provided by law, and taken before a district court to be examined and 
prosecuted." 
18 "Constables who developed from the 'tithing men' with responsibility for the 
good behavior of a 'tithing,' or group of ten houses, had their functions outlined 
by an old English statute in 1285 which defined the 'Watch and Ward' and directed 
them to watch during the night and arrest suspicious persons . ... [this act] 
simply restates the common law of New England." 36th Report of the Judicial 
Council, Pub. Doc. No. 144, at 69-70 (1960). 
5
Berney: Chapter 12: Criminal Law, Procedure and Administration
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1964
142 1964 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §12.2 
Section Two of the Uniform Arrest Act.19 There was, however, an 
intimation that such interrogation would not be confined to the terms 
of that particular statute.20 
One salutary aspect of the Lehan decision was the Court's willing-
ness to consider the language in Ker v. California21 as inviting the 
implementation of the exclusionary rule according to reasonable state 
standards. Quoting from the Ker case to the effect that "the States 
are not . . . precluded from developing workable rules governing 
arrests, searches, and seizures to meet 'the practical demands of effective 
criminal investigation and law enforcement,' "22 the Court, while recog-
nizing the binding effect of federal standards, maintained that "there 
will be incidents of the exclusionary rule not so established which 
State courts may fashion at least in the first instance."23 
Superficially it would seem to make no difference whether the fruits 
of a search are excluded because the search was made incidental to a 
detention only or because it was made incidental to an arrest based 
upon no probable cause. However, it is the implication of this dis-
tinction that creates doubt. Supposedly, if the search in the Lehan 
case had been postponed until after the arrest, which the Court deemed 
reasonable, it would have been a legal search incident to a lawful 
arrest.24 Therefore, the moment at which a mere detention becomes 
an arrest is crucia1.25 Clearly time alone cannot be the criterion, since 
an arrest is sometimes instantaneous.26 Perhaps the only workable 
test would be based on the content of a reasonable threshold inquiry. 
In the terms of the Uniform Arrest Act provision: "demand of him 
his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going."27 Un-
satisfactory or evasive replies to such inquiries, in the light of the 
circumstances and the knowledge of the officer,28 must either establish 
19 See Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 344 (1942). See also 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann., c. 594, §2 (1955); R.Io Gen. Laws §12-7-1 (1956). 
201964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 455, 460-461, 196 N.K2d 840, 845. 
21374 U.S. 23, 83 Sup. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963). 
221964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 455, 460, 196 N.E.2d 840, 844, quoting 374 U.S. 23, 34, 83 
Sup. Ct. 1623, 1630, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 738 (1963). 
23 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 455, 460, 196 N.E.2d 840, 844. See 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §1O.2, at 107-108 (discussion raising this issue of federal-state standards). Cf. 
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 401 nJ, 84 Sup. Ct. 1774, 1794 n.l, 12 L. Ed. 2d 
908, 930 n.l (1964) (Black J., dissenting). 
24 See 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 455, 462-463, 196 N.E.2d 840, 846. 
25 "The validity of the search thus turns upon the narrow question of when the 
arrest occurred." Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 262, 80 Sup. Ct. 1431, 1437, 
4 L. Ed. 2d 1688, 1694 (1960). 
The "smart criminal" in these circumstances may be able to gain an advantage by 
forcing the issue - asking whether he is under arrest and then attempting to leave 
should he receive a negative answer. 
26 Nor can we expect help from definitions. See Varon, Searches, Seizures and 
Immunities 70 (1961). 
27 Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 344 (1942). The signifi-
cance of consent is dubious in that a sense of compUlsion is natural in these cir-
cumstances. See Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
28 For example, if the police in Lehan had information of a burglary having been 
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the foundation for an arrest or else the suspect ought to be released. 
Detention beyond this stage, it is submitted, should amount to an arrest 
for the purpose of determining the legality of any subsequent searches 
and seizures. A similar end is achieved by the federal rule requiring 
that a detention be based upon probable cause.21I 
Another disturbing aspect of this case concerns the length of time a 
suspect may be held under the guise of detention without being charged 
and arraigned. The Uniform Arrest Act provides for a two-hour maxi-
mum limit before charges are preferred.So Not to impose reasonable 
restrictions on pre-arraignment police interrogations is to make a 
mockery of recent Supreme Court decisions regarding right to counselS1 
and prompt arraignment.32 This extraordinary power to arrest 
(detain) upon mere suspicion,ss if legitimate at all,34 must be construed 
strictly35 and certainly cannot be understood to give sanction to the "72 
hour hold for investigation" police practice36 or similar unsupportable 
investigatory procedures. To do otherwise would produce the ludi-
crous result of condemning the arrest without a warrant of persons com-
mitting a non-breach-of-the-peace offense in the presence of an officer 
while condoning an arrest in the nighttime on mere suspicion.87 
It is paradoxical that the law should seek to protect the integrity of 
the individual by suppressing evidence of guilt obtained by coercion or 
immoderate searches while allowing direct invasions of the freedom of 
committed in the area, they would have had probable cause for arresting a former 
burglary suspect who gave unsatisfactory answers to their questions. 
211 See note 15 supra. 
30 "The total period of detention shall not exceed two hours. The detention is 
not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest in any official record. At the 
end of the detention the person so detained shall be released or be arrested and 
charged with a crime." Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 344 
(1942). 
31 See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 
(1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 Sup. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 
246 (1964). 
82 See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 Sup. Ct. 1356, 1 L. Ed. 2d 
1479 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 
(1943). Although the McNabb-Mallory rule is not yet binding on the state courts, 
its force cannot be ignored by them. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 
Sup. Ct. 1202, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1265 (1959). 
3S Keating, Search and Seizure, 7 Boston Bar J. 11, 18 (No.3, 1963). 
34 See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 318, 79 Sup. Ct. 329, 336, 3 L. Ed. 
2d 327, 335 (1959) (Douglas J., dissenting). See also Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest 
on Suspicion, 70 Yale L.J. 1, 13 (1960). 
85 Once the special bases for a different rule of arrest during the nighttime have 
been dissipated, that is, once the identity of the suspect has been ascertained and 
it has been established that he is not engaging or about to engage in conduct which 
would amount to a breach of the peace (see Commonwealth v. Gorman, 288 Mass. 
294, 192 N.E. 618 (1934) and notes 7 and 8 supra), the ordinary criteria of lawful 
arrest ought to come into play. 
36 Varon, Searches, Seizures and Immunities 4 (1961). 
a7 Commonwealth v. Mekalian, 346 Mass. 496, 194 N.E.2d 390 (1963); Common-
wealth v. O'Conner, 7 Allen 583 (Mass. 1863); Commonwealth v. Ruggles, 6 Allen 
558 (Mass. 1863). 
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the individual by unwarranted arrests.88 The United States Supreme 
Court in Mapp9 decided to apply the exclusionary rule universally as 
the only effective deterrent to illegal searches and seizures.4o By 
analogy, the only effective deterrent to illegal arrests might be the 
barring of prosecutions arising out of such arrests.41 This is hardly a 
likely development.42 Firstly, the rule that illegal arrest provides no 
ground for challenging criminal jurisdiction is grounded in a well-
established policy that crimes are wrongs against the public order and 
therefore cannot be vitiated by the wrongdoing of the state's agents.43 
Secondly, it simply might be placing too great an obstacle in the path 
of zealous prosecution of our law enforcers' duties.44 
One alternative to this admittedly extreme remedy would be to 
extend the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to any evidence 
educed in connection with an illegal arrest.41i This issue was not 
quite reached in Commonwealth v. Palladino,46 since there the alleged 
"tainted evidence" - conceivably contradictory statements of the 
accused - was held not harmful. It is fair to infer, however, that the 
Massachusetts high Court does not mean to extend the doctrine beyond 
the limitations enunciated in Wong 81m v. United 8tates:47 
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal 
actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a 
case is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, 
the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at 
88 See Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 
1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 46; Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 N.W.U.L. Rev. 
16, 41-42 (1957). 
39367 U.S. 643,81 Sup. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). 
40 This rationale may already have been extended to the problem of self-incrimi-
nation - so intimately related to both search and seizure and arrest. Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 US. 1,84 Sup. Ct. 1489,12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964). 
41 See Note, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1182, 1215 (1952). Certainly the authorities are 
correct in describing the interrogation upon arrest as a most critical stage in es-
tablishing guilt. Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During 
Police Interrogation, 73 Yale L.J. 1000, 1041-1044 (1964); Note, The Supreme Court, 
1963 Term, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143,220 (1964). See §lU, nA, supra. 
42 Cf. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 Sup. Ct. 509, 96 L. Ed. 541 (1952); Ker 
v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 Sup. Ct. 225, 30 L. Ed. 421 (1886). See also Allen, Due 
Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 N.W.U.L. Rev. 16, 27-28 
(1953). 
48 See Commonwealth v. Miller, 297 Mass. 285, 287, 8 N.E.2d 603, 604 (1937); 
Commonwealth v. Gorman, 288 Mass. 294, 300, 192 N.E. 618, 620 (1934). 
44 The hue and cry of law enforcement officials would make faint, by contrast, 
the outcries against the Mapp and McNabb rules. The dire predictions con-
cerning the hampering of criminal administration have not materalized in the 
federal arena. But see Inbau, Police Interrogation - A Practical Necessity, 52 
J. Crim. L., C.8cP.S. 16 (1961). 
411 Cf. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 Sup. Ct. 266, 268, 84 L. Ed. 
lI07, lIll-312 (1939); Commonwealth v. Spofford, 3411 Mass. 703, 708, 180 N.E.2d 673, 
676 (1962). 
46346 Mass. 720, 195 N.E.2d 769 (1964). 
47 37l U.S. 471, 83 Sup. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). 
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by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."48 
These are hardly distinctions apt to deter either illegal arrests or 
ordinary wrongful interrogation techniques.49 The interest in prompt 
and efficient law enforcement and the interest in preventing the 
abridgement of individual rights by unconstitutional means of law 
enforcement are sometimes hard to reconcile. 
§12.3. Search warrant: Hearsay. Only two other cases, both aris-
ing in the federal courts in Massachusetts, deserve some mention in this 
Chapter. Both raise issues collateral to the topic under discussion 
above. 
With the increased emphasis on search and arrest matters, the basis 
for issuance of search and arrest warrants has gained corresponding 
significance in recent years.1 It is not surprising, therefore, to discover 
new legislative efforts in this area.2 In Ventresca v. United States,3 
the validity of a search warrant issued on the basis of hearsay evidence, 
to an indeterminate degree, was reviewed. The First Circuit Court 
of Appeals, one judge dissenting, considered an affidavit comprising 
information based on personal knowledge of the affiant, a federal 
agent, and reports of observations and investigations obtained from 
other federal agents, inadequate in that it failed to distinguish the 
personal knowledge from the hearsay and failed to state whether such 
hearsay was direct or not. The decision is significant in its refusal 
to accept as a basis for issuance the fact that all information allegedly 
came from government agents. Apparently the warrant issuer must 
also know the basis and nature of the information before he can 
rightly judge its reliability and credibility, notwithstanding the un-
questionable trustworthiness of the informant.4 This is a strict, but 
justified, reading of issuance of warrants based on hearsay as sanc-
tioned in Jones v. United States.5 
§12.4. Illegal arrest: Inadmissible evidence. The other federal 
decision of interest is Burke v. United States'! In that case one John 
Burke was sought for questioning by postal authorities in connection 
with a mail robbery. Co-operating Boston police officers arrested 
John'S brother Leo when he arrived at John's home in an intoxicated 
48Id. at 487-488, 83 Sup. Ct. at 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 455, quoted in 346 Mass. 720, 
724, 195 N.E.2d 769, 771 (1964). 
49 See generally Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures, 1961 U. Ill. L. Forum 78; 
Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, 51 J. Crim. L., C.8cP.S. 
386 (1960). 
§12.3. 1 See discussion in §11.2, n.l3 et seq. supra. 
2 G.L., c. 276, §§1-7, amended by Acts of 1964, c. 557, §§1·7. See §12.5 infra. 
3324 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1963). 
4 Cf. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 Sup. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 
(1960); United States v. McCormick, 309 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 
U.S. 911, 83 Sup. Ct. 724, 9 L. Ed. 2d 719 (1963). 
5362 u.s. 257, 80 Sup. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960). 
§12.4. 1328 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1964). 
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condition. The only explanation he received of his arrest was that 
he was "under suspicion of a mail robbery in Dorchester." A search 
of his person disclosed $118 in bills, some of which, it was later learned, 
were marked bills taken in the mail robbery. At the time of his 
arrest Leo was not considered a federal suspect, but postal inspectors, 
when informed of his arrest, availed themselves of the earliest opportu-
nity, seven hours after arrest, to question him. During this interroga-
tion one of the inspectors was given permission to have the bills ex-
amined, after he had warned Leo of the possible consequences and 
advised him of his constitutional rights. 
The court found Leo's arrest to be illegal. Nevertheless, evidence 
obtained during the arrest and interrogation was not excluded, be-
cause "not every statement or surrender of property made during an 
illegal arrest is created inadmissible because of the illegal arrest."2 
The evidence was found to be voluntarily surrendered. 
Perhaps of greater consequence is the holding that Rule 5(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring arraignment without 
unnecessary delay, had not been violated because the facts were in-
sufficient to constitute Leo a federal prisoner under the protection 
of those rules.s The only case cited in support of this holding was 
U:nited States v. Coppola,4 which was described by Judge Aldrich, in 
a dissenting opinion, as inapposite, since there the suspect was held on 
bona fide state charges.1I Although the court does say that Leo was 
booked on state charges, the dissent indicates that there is no evidence 
to support this statement,6 and the statements of fact seem contra.7 
It would appear that "the mere fact that it [federal authority] had 
not requested the arrest does not mean ... that the excessive detention 
was not under the circumstances a 'working arrangement: ... "8 The 
implications of this case, if not the facts, are highly reminiscent of 
the "silver platter doctrine:'11 Cases like this, whatever one's view 
of the exigencies of pre-arraignment interrogation, can only accelerate 
the process of federal standardization of rules of criminal procedure. 
§12.5. Testimony before legislative hearing: Immunity from crim-
inal prosecution. Quite coincidentally, the only criminal prosecu-
tion initiated in Massachusetts to reach the Supreme Court of the 
United States last year raised issues representative of those which beset 
2Id. at 402. Cf. Commonwealth v. Palladino, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 175, 195 
N.E.2d 769. 
S The circuit court avoided the district court's contention that the arraignment 
rule was not applicable to one too drunk to recognize the nature of the proceed-
ings. 328 F.2d 399, 403 (1st Cir. 1964). 
4281 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1960), aU'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 762, 81 Sup. Ct. 884, 6 
L. Ed. 2d 79 (1961). 
5328 F.2d 399, 404 (1st Cir. 1964). 
6Id. at 403. 
7Id. at 402. 
8Id. at 404 (dissent); see Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350, 63 Sup. Ct. 599, 
87 L. Ed. 829 (1943). 
II See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 
(1960). 
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the Supreme Judicial Court this past SURVEY year. In United States 
v. Welden1 the Supreme Court, reversing the dismissal of an indict-
ment by the United States District Court of Massachusetts,2 held that 
a person who had testified before a Congressional subcommittee 
concerning matters covered by indictment was not immune from 
prosecution thereunder.s The resolution of intriguing issues of 
statutory construction involving, as the majority perceived it, questions 
of amendment by implication,4 led to the conclusion that the immu-
nity provision of the act under scrutiny5 applied only to persons 
testifying in judicial proceedings. The words "in any proceeding, 
suit, or prosecution under said Acts"6 were construed not to include 
testimony before legislative committees. 
The concerns raised in the Welden case, particularly as emphasized 
in dissent,7 broadly reflect apprehensions very pertinent to Massa-
chusetts today. What are the legitimate ends and purposes of legisla-
tive investigating committees; what limitations ought to be placed on 
their powers; and what safeguards must be accorded individuals re-
quired to testify before such committees? These are but some of the 
questions that will be pressed on our courts as the role and function of 
the Massachusetts Crime Commission are more clearly delineated 
in cases still t.o come before the Supreme Judicial Court. The har-
bingers have already appeared. 
The Welden case reflected most specifically the same issues which 
involved the Crime Commission in its first case to reach the Supreme 
Judicial Court last year. In Commonwealth v. Benoit8 the Court 
rejected a claim of immunity from prosecution which related to testi-
mony presented before the Crime Commission. The claim of im-
munity was based upon General Laws, Chapter 271, Section 39, which 
relates to acts of bribery of persons or corporations engaged in private 
business. The relevant portion of Section 39 provides that: 
... no person shall be liable to any suit or prosecution, civil or 
criminal, for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing 
concerning which he may testify or produce evidence ... before 
said court or in obedience to its subpoena or in any such case or 
proceeding. 
In reaching the conclusion that this immunity provision did not 
extend to testimony given before the Crime Commission, the Court 
§12.5. 1 377 U.S. 95, 84 Sup. Ct. 1082, 12 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1964). 
2215 F. Supp. 656 (D. Mass. 1963). 
S The indictment was for conspiracy to fix milk prices and to defraud the United 
States, in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 
15 U.S.C. §1 (1962); 62 Stat. 701 (1948), 18 U .s.C. §371 (1962). 
4 This involves questions admirably suited for inclusion in materials such as 
Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process (1958), but not appropriate for treatment here. 
Il Act of Feb. 25, 1903, 32 Stat. 903, 904 (1903), 15 U.S.C. §32 (1958). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Justices Black and Douglas joined each other in separate dissents, 377 U.S. 95, 
107, 115, 84 Sup. Ct. 1082, 1090, 1094, 12 L. Ed. 2d 152, 162, 166 (1964). 
81964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 221, 196 N.E.2d 228. 
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stressed that the term "said court" referred to the phrase "any court 
having jurisdiction of the offence," which appeared in the immediately 
preceding sentence of Section 39:9 
No person shall be excused from ... testifying or producing ... 
documents before any court or in obedience to the subpoena of any 
court having jurisdiction of the offence described herein on the 
ground ... that the testimony or evidence ... may tend to crimi-
nate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. 
This rather narrow construction of an immunity statute, ignoring 
as it does the possible significance of the last words of the provision, 
"or in any such case or proceeding," is most discouraging, especially 
since it was not necessary to the decision of the case. The defendant's 
argument that, in view of its relevant power to issue summonses and 
subpoena witnesses, and ultimately to compel testimony "in the same 
manner and to the same extent as before ... courts,"10 the Commission 
is a court, within the purpose and meaning of the immunity clause of 
Section 39, hardly necessitated the adoption of this "court having 
jurisdiction of the offence" construction. If the Court believed other-
wise, why then did it add the broader ground that the Commission, 
notwithstanding the defendant's contentions, is not a court?l1 This 
last point was embellished with the following dictum: 
The commission is merely authorized to investigate, find facts, 
make studies, and file reports which may be used as a basis for 
legislative action. It lacks power to apply the law or to prescribe 
punishment. To hold otherwise would raise serious constitu-
tional doubts as to the separation of powers.12 
Finally, why did the Court consider the immunity provlSlons of 
Section 39 at all, since in fact the indictment charged only violations 
of bribery laws applicable to public officials, which laws contain no im-
munity provisions?18 
Given the history of crime commissions in the Commonwealth,a 
9 This eminently logical reading is similar to the common sense interpretation 
which prevailed in the Welden case: "The words 'any proceeding, suit, or prosecu-
tion under said Acts' in the proviso plainly refer to the phrase 'proceedings. suits. 
and prosecutions under said Acts in the courts of the United States: in the previous 
sentence." 377 U.S. 95. 97, 84 Sup. Ct. 1082, 1084. 12 L. Ed. 2d 152. 156 (1964). 
(Emphasis supplied by Court.) 
10 Resolves of 1962. c. 146, para. 4 (Resolution establishing the Crime Commission). 
111964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 221. 225. 196 N.E.2d 228. 231. 
12 Ibid. This dictum could have been a source of embarassment to the Court 
in subsequent cases in which the extension of the Commission's activities beyond 
these limits was attacked. 
18 See id. at 223-224. 196 N.E.2d at 230-231; Commonwealth v. Benoit. 346 Mass. 
294. 191 N.E.2d 749 (1963); G.L .• c. 268A. §8; G.L.. c. 268. §8, repealed by Acts of 
1962. c. 779. §3. 
14 See Resolves of 1953. c. 100; Cabot v. Corcoran. 332 Mass. 44. 123 N.E.2d 225 
(1954); Corcoranv. Commonwealth. 335 Mass. 29. 138 N.E.2d 348 (1956). 
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the wisdom of conferring immunity on persons compelled to testifyllS 
before legislative investigative bodies is questionable.16 As to the 
current Crime Commission, the question was clearly settled by a 
decision not to include any immunity provisions.17 It does not 
necessarily follow, however, that specific immunity provisions passed 
in conjunction with particular criminal statutes, for presumably 
good and sufficient reasons, will not apply with equal force to legisla-
tive investigatory proceedings. 
Two other cases involving the Crime Commission this past year 
pertained to the efforts of the Commission to obtain information re-
garding certain practices and transactions of the Massachusetts Turn-
pike Authority.18 The effect of the cases, taken together, is that re-
luctant public officials or agencies may not be compelled to give testi-
mony or produce evidence in connection with Crime Commission in-
vestigations into their affairs, except in conformity with the general 
subpoena and summons powers applicable to all persons. 
A somewhat cynical, but nonetheless accurate, description of the 
effect of the holding in Gardner v. Callahan19 is that governmental 
officials and departments are under no special obligation to cooperate 
in the Commission's task of uncovering corrupt practices in govern-
ment. There the Court sustained a demurrer to a petition for a writ 
of mandamus which would have required the Turnpike Authority to 
make available to the Crime Commission certain of its records. It 
did not appear that the requests would unreasonably interfere with 
the work of the Authority or unduly inconvenience it. Nor would it 
appear that a court is unable to determine whether such requests are 
reasonable.20 Presumably much of the same information was sought 
for examination under the subpoena powers sustained in Gardner v. 
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.21 
The articulated ground of decision in Callahan, in the words of the 
demurrer, is that the "duty of cooperation . . . imposed by . . . 
Chapter 14622 contains no legislative standard and is too vague 
and uncertain to be enforced by the courts."28 It is believed, however, 
lIS Another strange element in this case is that it is unclear whether the testimony 
given was voluntary or compelled. It is quite difficult to make out any case for 
immunity based on voluntary testimony. See United States v. Armour and Co., 
142 Fed. 808 (N.D. Ill. 1906); 34 Stat. 798 (1906), 15 U.S.C. §33 (1958). 
16 There may be constitutional doubts as well. See Ullman v. United States, 
350 U.S. 422, 440, 76 Sup. Ct. 497, 507, 100 L. Ed. 511, 525 (1956). 
17 Senate Nos. 272, 519, 578 (1962), all contained specific immunity clauses. Senate 
No. 890 (1962), out of which Resolves of 1962, c. 146, grew, did not. 
18 Gardner v. Callahan, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 243, 196 N.E.2d 301; Gardner v. 
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 881, 199 N.E.2d 186. 
19 Gardner v. Callahan, supra at 244-245, 196 N.E.2d at 301-302. 
20 See Finance Commission of Boston v. McGrath, 343 Mass. 754, 180 N.E.2d 
808 (1962). 
211964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 881, 882, 888-889, 199 N.E.2d 186, 189, 192. 
22 Resolves of 1962, c. 146, para. 3. "The Commission may require the co-
operation of all agencies of state and local governments." 
281964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 243, 244, 196 N.E.2d 301, 302. 
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that this unwillingness of the Court to give force to the legislative 
requirement of cooperation has less to do with the vagueness of the 
standard24 than with a reluctance to interfere with the conduct of the 
affairs of co-ordinate branches of government. A sound sense of 
judicial self-restraint may inform such a decision but where, as here, 
it forces a foolish result - causing the Crime Commission to resort 
to the procedurally restrictive and cumbersome device of gaining 
information piecemeal from governmental agencies by summons and 
subpoena211 - one may have wished for a bit more daring on the part 
of the Court.26 Perhaps until such time as we develop something akin 
to the French Administrative Court system,27 any growth of a rule of 
law within the administrative branch of government must remain the 
work of our judiciary. 
As mentioned previously, the Court did sustain the efforts of the 
Commission to obtain its information about Turnpike Authority 
activities through the summons and subpoena powers, rejecting both 
objections that the summonses were too broad and general and asser-
tions of inconvenience.28 Almost as if to ameliorate the effect of the 
rebuff in Callahan, the Court appeared in the Turnpike Authority case 
to be quite solicitous of the broad investigatory needs of a body 
charged with the obligations of the Commission. It refused to limit 
the summons powers to inquiries into specific transactions, such as 
would be required of a summons in connection with the trial of 
criminal cases. The respondents contended that such a limitation was 
required by that portion of the Resolve which authorized enforcement 
of summonses "in the same manner and to the same extent as before 
said courts." This passage, the Court replied, was intended only to 
incorporate procedures to enforce compliance with summonses issued 
24 The Court maintained that "courts are not equipped for the task of carrying 
on supervision of cooperation," particularly where uncertainty of definition is based 
upon necessarily elastic interpretations. It is submitted that this task is not much 
different from interpreting any other standards, an activity in which courts con-
stantly indulge. In any case, whatever elasticity appears in the term "cooperation," 
it certainly includes minimally free access to governmental records. Id. at 243, 
245, 196 N.E.2d 30l, 302. 
211 A method appropriate to safeguarding the constitutional privileges of un-
willing witnesses, but wholly inapposite where no constitutional claims are possible. 
26 If anything, the supplemental grounds of the Callahan decision enfeeble the 
holding. See id. at 245-246, 196 N.E.2d at 302. Clearly, special obligations on the 
part of the Commissioner of Public Safety, whose department of government is 
charged with the ordinary process of crime detection and investigation, are to be 
expected, and these will hardly be the measure of the standards to be imposed on 
all other agencies. Likewise, the precise citation of the detail in which the summons 
process must be stated detracts from the position that the legislature did not con-
template a different process for obtaining information from governmental depart-
ments. 
27 See Langrod, The French Council of State: Its Role in the Formulation and 
Implementation of Administrative Law, 49 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 673 (1955). 
28 Gardner v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 881, 199 
N.E.2d 186. 
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and did not limit the broad investigatory power of the legislature2ll 
here delegated to the Commission.30 Thus, a Commission empowered 
to conduct investigations and studies to provide "a basis for legisla-
tive action" is "in effect directed by the Legislature to make 
general inquiries, and the investigation of a general pattern 
is within the scope of the authorization."sl This is not to say 
that the summons need not conform to established limitations with 
regard to adequate specification of the subject of the inquiry,B2 a 
description with reasonable particularity of the records to be produced 
and exclusion of records plainly irrelevant to the subject of such 
inquiry.38 In the face of the extension of the permissible breadth of 
summonses issued by administrative bodies, as noted by the Court,8. 
there can be little question of the correctness of the Court's rulings 
on the matters thus far discussed. 
Another aspect of the Turnpike Authority case raises issues of serious 
difficulty and doubt. Both in this case and in Sheridan v. Gardner,35 
the Commission's status as an investigatory arm of the legislature has 
been challenged. The easy dictum of the Benoit case,36 to the effect 
that the Commission is clearly part of the legislative branch of govern-
ment, is now made a point at issue. Relying (1) on the Commission's 
own views of its role, as described in its May81 and December88 1963 
Reports, in conjunction with (2) the Commission's practice of "sub-
mit[ting] to the ... Attorney General such evidence ... as in the 
opinion of the Commission warrants such submission"39 and (3) the 
appointment by the Attorney General of the counsel for the Com-
mission as a Special Assistant Attorney General, for the ostensible 
2Il Citing Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187, 77 Sup. Ct. 1173, 1179, 
1 L. Ed. 2d 1273, 1284 (1957). 
301964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 881, 887, 199 N.E.2d 186, 192. 
81Id. at 887-888, 199 N.E.2d at 192. 
82 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.s. 178, 77 Sup. Ct. 1173, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1273 
(1957). 
83 See Finance Commission of Boston v. McGrath, 343 Mass. 754, 761, 765, 180 
N.E.2d 808, 813, 816 (1962). 
34 See Civil Aeronautics Board v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322, 77 Sup. Ct. 804, 1 L. 
Ed. 2d 852 (1957), rev'g per curiam, 237 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1956); Oklahoma Press 
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 Sup. Ct. 494, 90 L. Ed. 614 (1945); 
Note, 69 Yale L.J. 131, 131·134 (1959). 
351964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 229, 196 N.E.2d 303. 
861964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 221, 225, 196 N.E.2d 228, 231. 
31 Second Report of the Massachusetts Crime Commission to the Legislature, 
May 22, 1963, p. 8, wherein it was stated that " ... if limited investigations would 
enable the Commission to recommend significant legislation, such legislation would 
be a futile gesture if the persons in power who are primarily responsible for 
corruption are not eliminated." 
38 Third Report· of the Massachusetts Crime Commission to the Legislature, 
Dec. 2, 1963, p. 3, wherein it was said that this "cannot be done until their guilt 
has been proven by their conviction." 
39 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 881, 884, 199 N.E.2d 186, 190. Resolves of 1962, c. 146, 
para. 6, expressly authorizes the Commission to submit evidence to the Attorney 
General. 
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purpose of his presenting to the grand jury the evidence obtained by 
the Commission,40 the petitioner in Sheridan and respondents in 
Turnpike Authority contended that the Commission had become, in 
effect, an agency of law enforcement and prosecution of crime and 
that this constitutes a violation of the mandate of Article XXX of 
the Declaration of Rights.41 
The intricate constitutional issues evoked by the presentation of 
this inquiry into separation of powers far exceed the scope of this 
chapter. One might conclude that the Supreme Judicial Court was 
similarly in no mood to tangle with this problem directly. In Turn-
pike Authority the Court quite adroitly avoided it by suggesting that 
respondents' standing to raise the matter is subject to doubts.42 In 
Sheridan, where the private rights of an individual may become con-
cerned, the standing argument carries less force. Instead, that 
opinion avoids a clear declaration on the issue of separation by 
directing its discussion to collateral matters. Possibly what the Court 
in Sheridan intended by pointing out the absence of exposure for the 
sake of exposure48 is that at the hearing stage the Resolve requires 
secret proceedings identical to those conducted by a grand jury,44 or 
that there is no constitutional protection for engaging in organized 
crime,411 or that no abridgment of rights is caused by the practices 
of the Commission.46 
In the two cases, then, the Court ultimately resolved this argument 
of separation by holding that the practices of the Commission in aid 
of law enforcement did not invalidate its legitimate legislative func-
tions carried forward by the issuance of the summonses in question.47 
401964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 881, 884, 199 N.E.2d 186, 190. 
41 This requires separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers. 
42 These doubts were raised because they have no standing to protest on con-
stitutional grounds the conduct of criminal proceedings initiated against others, 
citing Hynson, Westcott &: Dimming, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Health, 1964 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 37, 195 N.E.2d 743, and because as public officials their private 
rights may not be sufficiently involved to establish claims of constitutional infringe-
ment, citing Assessors of Haverhill v. New England Telephone &: Telegraph Co., 
332 Mass. 357, 124 N.E.2d 917 (1955). See 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 881, 886, 889, 199 
N.E.2d 186, 191, 193. 
43 Distinguishing Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200, 77 Sup. Ct. 1173, 
1185-1186, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1273, 1291 (1957). See 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 229, 237, 196 
N.E.2d 303, 309. 
44 Resolves of 1962, c. 146, para. 5. 
411 This should be compared with the protection of free expression. See Sweezy 
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 77 Sup. Ct. 1203, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311 (1957); Gibson v. 
Florida Legislative Investigation Commn., 372 U.S. 539, 83 Sup. Ct. 889, 9 L. Ed. 
2d 1424 (1963). 
46 The allusion to the Supreme Court's holdings that separation of powers is not 
mandatory in state governments under the Fourteenth Amendment is also seen as 
an effort to demonstrate that serious individual rights are not being abridged. See 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255, 77 Sup. Ct. 1203, 1214, 1 L. Ed. 2d 
1311, 1327 (1957); Carfer v. Caldwell, 200 u.s. 293, 297, 26 Sup. Ct. 264, 26,5, 50 
L. Ed. 488, AB9 (1906). 
47 This formulation is expressed in Gardner v. Massachusetts Turnpike Author-
ity, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 881, 886, 199 N.E.2d 186, 190. 
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The Court found support for this position by quoting from Nelson v. 
Wyman,48 to the effect that: "When the investigation provided foris a 
general one, the discovery of a specific, individual violation of law 
is collateral and subordinate to the main object of the inquiry .... 
The existence of such a possibility does not change the investigation 
from a legislative to a criminal one."49 1£ by taking this tack the 
Court is merely deferring a decision on the constitutional merits to a 
case in which an individual is indicted on the basis of evidence sub-
mitted to the grand jury by the Commission, this may prove regrettable 
judicial policy. It is conceivable that many criminals will be able to 
evade prosecution simply because an unconstitutional practice was not 
stopped in time.50 The Sheridan case was dismissed on appeal to 
the United States Supreme Court for want of a substantial federal 
question.51 The destruction of organized crime and the exposure of 
corrupt practices are matters of deep importance in the Common-
wealth. It is hoped that the Supreme Judicial Court has made the 
right policy determination with regard to the ultimate attainment of 
these goals. 
4899 N.H. 33, 38, 105 A.2d 756, 762 (1954). See also Matter of Di Brizzi, 303 
N.Y. 206, 101 N.E.2d 464 (1951); Washington v. Superior Court, 40 Wash. 2d 502, 
244 P.2d 668 (1952). 
49 Sheridan v. Gardner, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 229, 238, 196 N.E.2d 228, 310, quoting 
from Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 38, 105 A.2d 756, 762 (1954). 
50 This is in the event that the practice of turning over Crime Commission findings 
on individual criminal behavior to the Attorney General is found unconstitutional. 
If, as suggested in the Turnpike Authority case, the investigative power of a legisla-
tive body is broader than that of the grand jury, see Matter of Moore v. Delaney, 
180 Misc. 844, 45 N.Y.S.2d 95, (Sup. Ct. 1943); Note, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 590 (1961), 
then certainly there is some doubt that evidence uncovered by legislative investiga-
tion can be freely turned over to prosecuting authorities. 
51 Sheridan v. Gardner, 379 u.S. 647, 85 Sup. Ct. 612, 13 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1965). 
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